
Icebreaker PDF (Limited Copy)

Viktor Suvorov







Icebreaker Summary

Unveiling Stalin's Strategy Before Hitler's Blitzkrieg Written by New York Central Park Page Turners Books Club





About the book

In "Icebreaker," Viktor Suvorov delivers a thought-provoking analysis of the Soviet Union's role in the outbreak of World War II. He argues that, against common belief, Joseph Stalin was ready to invade Germany just as Adolf Hitler initiated his attack. Suvorov's captivating narrative confronts traditional historical perspectives, revealing the strategic moves and secret preparations that characterized this chaotic era. In doing so, he reshapes our understanding of one of history's most crucial conflicts.





About the author

Viktor Suvorov, a former Soviet Army officer, defected to England in 1978. There, he shifted his focus to a career as a teacher and advisor for news agencies. He has become a bestselling author, celebrated for his enlightening works on World War II, the special operations of the Soviet Army, military intelligence, and the Red Army. Suvorov is particularly notable among historians for his controversial view that Hitler launched the war against Russia to prevent a possible Soviet invasion of Germany.








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
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Chapter 1 Summary: 2

Chapter 5: The Pact and Its Consequences

Stalin's shrewdness was evident in his interactions with Hitler. Initially, the Non-Aggression Pact appeared balanced, but Stalin cleverly undermined Hitler by delaying Soviet military readiness precisely as Hitler launched the invasion of Poland. This decision forced Germany into a two-front war, dramatically intensifying the conflict that would erupt into World War II. The West, particularly Britain and France, swiftly turned against Germany, labeling Hitler as the war's main aggressor while permitting Stalin to maintain a position of neutrality and opportunism.

Capitalizing on the chaos of war, Stalin expanded Soviet territory in Poland and Eastern Europe, thereby reinforcing his power. Although the two dictators initially seemed to be allies, Stalin's true aim was to weaken both sides before entering the conflict to establish Soviet supremacy.

Stalin sought to manipulate and exhaust his adversaries, following a long-term strategy he had discussed in past political gatherings. His goal was to create a scenario in which capitalist nations would engage in a self-destructive conflict, thereby allowing the USSR to expand its territory and influence once the dust settled. The ideological foundation of Soviet





strategy included tactical patience and leveraging Western support at crucial moments, ultimately fostering a misleading narrative that the USSR was reluctantly drawn into the war.

Chapter 6: When Did the Soviet Union Enter World War II?

A critical examination of Soviet propaganda reveals numerous myths about the USSR's entry into World War II, particularly the false claim that June 22, 1941, was the defining moment of neutrality. This narrative suggests that the USSR had been a bystander up to that date, despite its own aggressive actions against neighboring countries following 1939. The portrayal attempts to frame the Soviet Union as a victim in the instigation of war, which starkly contradicts the reality of its territorial expansion under Stalin's orders.

These fabrications serve political purposes by depicting the Soviet state as a reluctant participant rather than a strategic aggressor that took advantage of conflicts in Poland and Finland. The implication is that the Soviet Union played a crucial role in escalating hostilities while simultaneously safeguarding its own interests.

Chapter 7: 'Extending the Foundations of War'





During World War II, Soviet military strategy was steeped in Marxist revolutionary ideology, in which military operations aimed to assert Soviet dominance through terror and political control over occupied territories. The modernization of military thought in the Soviet Union focused on creating local governments in conquered areas while fostering a culture of violence, as emphasized by prominent military leaders who developed their strategies around offensive tactics and coercive practices.

The pursuit of these ideas fueled extensive military campaign planning, where innovative tactics showcased the operational art of deep operations that breached enemy territories and enabled rapid Sovietization after victories.

Chapter 8: Why Howitzer Artillery for the Chekists?

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The punitive mechanisms of the Soviet regime evolved from overt violence to a more systematic control through military and police forces. As NKVD units grew, equipped with heavy machinery, their responses to internal dissent and external threats became increasingly militarized.

These punitive units often operated covertly, enforcing party loyalty through extreme measures while remaining prepared for external conflicts. The rising



militarization of internal security hinted at significant implications for how the Soviet Union would respond to external threats.

Chapter 9: Why the Security Zone Was Dismantled on the Eve of War

As World War II loomed, the Red Army's strategic decisions regarding defensive measures raised pressing questions about their intentions. Policy shifts led to the dismantling of critical security zones necessary for defense and the reinforcement of northern borders. This facilitated a swift German advance into Soviet territories, as many defensive preparations were set aside in favor of establishing supply lines for an aggressive push into Western Europe.

Rather than anticipating conflict, the preparations suggested an offensive capacity, reflecting the state's aggressive ambitions rather than a defensive posture against invasion. This strategic miscalculation ultimately resulted in severe consequences when Germany launched its invasion, leaving the Soviet Union vulnerable at its borders.

In summary, Chapters 5 and the following sections reveal the premeditated and duplicitous nature of Soviet foreign policy, military strategies, and internal security in the lead-up to World War II. By manipulating international conflicts, the Soviet Union positioned itself to expand its





influence while maintaining an appearance of passivity, setting the stage for significant territorial shifts in post-war Europe.





Chapter 2 Summary: 3

Chapter Summary: History of the Stalin Line and Its Abolition

The Purpose of the Stalin Line

The Stalin Line was a series of fortified regions built along the western

frontier of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, aimed not just at defense but for

offensive military operations. With substantial military resources allocated,

each fortified region was designed to engage in independent warfare while

ensuring the effective deployment of Soviet forces.

Construction Details

Thirteen fortified regions were created, each equipped with extensive

military capabilities, including artillery, machine-gun battalions, and

fortified installations. Unlike the more publicly recognized French Maginot

Line, the construction of the Stalin Line was conducted in secrecy and

involved camouflage. Its design was specifically intended to halt enemy tank

advances and withstand air attacks.

Transition to Offensive Strategy



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After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, which significantly changed security dynamics, Stalin ordered a halt to the development of the fortified regions. Rather than bolstering defenses, troop presence was diminished and existing fortifications dismantled to pivot towards offensive military strategies against potential adversaries like Germany, abandoning the earlier defensive posture.

Dismantling of the Stalin Line

By early 1940, Stalin's government started demolishing the Stalin Line, reallocating resources elsewhere. This decision was motivated by a shift towards preparing for offensive operations and the belief that the fortifications were no longer necessary. This drastic action rendered the once-formidable defensive line ineffective, especially as the threat from Germany was growing.

Impact on Soviet Military Preparedness

Despite the perceived limitations of the Stalin Line, its destruction is widely regarded as a significant strategic misstep. The Red Army's defensive capabilities suffered greatly, leaving the Soviet Union vulnerable at the onset of World War II. Historical analyses emphasize that the lack of a secondary line of defense was a critical flaw in Soviet military planning, particularly in the face of the German invasion.





Conclusion

The shift from a focus on offensive readiness to the dismantling of the Stalin Line marked a crucial turning point in Soviet military history. The resulting vulnerabilities were exploited during the initial phases of the German invasion, leading to significant losses for the Red Army before it could effectively reorganize and respond to the emerging threats of the war.





Chapter 3 Summary: 4

Summary of Chapter 15: The Marine Infantry in the Forests of Byelorussia

This chapter discusses the formation and deployment of the Soviet marine infantry in response to looming threats before World War II. Lacking marine units initially, the Red Army established its marine infantry in June 1940 due to Germany's aggressive maneuvers in Europe. This new force was primarily organized within the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, as well as the Dnieper Naval Flotilla, where a company was stationed in the marshlands of Byelorussia, indicating a strategic emphasis on potential offensive operations.

The author highlights that, despite the unpreparedness for defensive warfare, Soviet forces were actively engaged in offensive training and landing exercises. This intense training included large-scale maneuvers designed to prepare troops for potential invasions of neighboring countries, conducted under the scrutiny of top Soviet commanders, reflecting a serious commitment to future military engagements.

The narrative illustrates Stalin's pre-war strategy of establishing military formations along the western borders of the Soviet Union, aimed at deterrence as well as the possibility of offensive action against perceived





enemies. Thus, the presence of substantial marine and mobile infantry forces formed part of a broader Soviet plan to project military power in the region.

Summary of Chapter 16: What are 'Armies of Covering Forces'?

This chapter introduces the concept of "covering forces" in Soviet military strategy, initially framed as a defensive posture but ultimately designed for offensive operations. As the Soviet Union prepared for war, it established several armies along its western borders, signaling intentions for a surprise invasion rather than mere defense against external threats.

The text outlines the historical context surrounding these armies, noting their formation even before the official start of World War II. Each army had specific roles, primarily focused on rapid mobilization and preparation for offensive incursions into neighboring territories rather than defensive responses. This detail exposes an underlying strategy of aggression masquerading as defensive readiness.

The chapter concludes by emphasizing the distinctive characteristics of Soviet forces, categorizing them into various types of combat formations, some designated as "shock armies," intended for swift and deep penetrations into enemy territory.





Summary of Chapter 17: Mountain Divisions on the Steppes of the Ukraine

In this chapter, the strategic deployment of Soviet mountain divisions in areas considered suitable for offensive operations is examined. Contrary to the Soviet command's public narrative of defensive preparations, this chapter

reveals that these formations were primarily structured for aggressive tactics.

Particular focus is given to the 12th Army, detailing its composition and the development of its troops as they adapted to exploit vulnerable geographic regions, such as the Carpathians, for offensive maneuvers against Germany. The text underscores that there were no plans for defensive action; instead, the army's exercises and training were explicitly oriented towards offensive

However, the chapter also notes that the mountain divisions ultimately proved ill-suited for the rapid movement and conditions necessary in the impending battle areas. This misalignment resulted in significant strategic disadvantages when the German forces invaded, leading to heavy casualties for the Red Army due to outdated plans unable to address the fast-evolving dynamics of the battlefield.

Summary of Chapter 18: The Purpose of the First Strategic Echelon



strategies.

This chapter summarizes the First Strategic Echelon of the Soviet Union, consisting of 16 armies and numerous corps, strategically located for offensive action across various fronts. Founded under the doctrine of active aggression, these forces represented a military structure designed for surprise and rapid engagement.

The text notes that internal military discussions prior to the war recognized the necessity for decisive offensive operations without full mobilization, demonstrating a concerted effort to prepare for large-scale conflict.

Additionally, logistics were arranged for rapid mobilization, underscoring a readiness that contradicted claims of merely preparing for defense.

Ultimately, the author argues that the Soviet military infrastructure was poised to initiate an aggressive campaign against Germany; however, the unexpected onset of World War II disrupted these plans, revealing the hidden intentions behind the hastily constructed military formations.

Summary of Chapter 19: Stalin in May

In this chapter, the author analyzes the crucial events of May 1941, providing insights into Stalin's actions and the military posture of the Soviet Union in anticipation of conflict with Germany. Stalin's appointment as head





of government on May 6, 1941, raised questions about his motivations and the implications for Soviet foreign policy.

The narrative highlights the tensions of the period, noting that Stalin's consolidation of power did not align with defensive preparations but indicated a quieter intention to apply pressure in Europe, potentially for an aggressive campaign. The chapter suggests that messages from Soviet leadership during this time were layered with veiled intentions toward war.

Stalin's secretive speech to military leaders indicated an awareness of the German threat, yet also revealed a lack of actionable defensive strategy in response to such threats. Discussions surrounding "unexpected events" underscored the idea that Stalin's preparations were aimed more at instigating conflict than simply reacting to one. The chapter ultimately demonstrates the duplicity in Soviet military planning, revealing a strategy focused on offensive action rather than merely responding to invasion.



Chapter 4: 5

CHAPTER 20: Words and Actions

Words often fail to align with actions, as seen when Stalin proclaimed in

May 1941 that a war with Germany would not begin until 1942. Despite the

supposed confidentiality of his speech, the details rapidly reached Soviet

military leaders and academicians. Evidence indicates that Stalin was aware

of the preparations for aggressive conflict against Germany, as he issued

directives to generals to ready their forces for an offensive, even while

publicly asserting the contrary.

In defensive conflicts, soldiers typically react swiftly once they recognize an

invasion. However, the directive issued by Stalin in May mandated that any

response must come from command, signaling a preference for aggression

rather than defense. As the German invasion loomed, Soviet military

movements surged dramatically, disguised as routine exercises. This

inconsistency raised concerns regarding the genuine intentions behind the

Soviet troop concentrations near the German front.

CHAPTER 21: Living Peaceably with Sharp Teeth



Stalin's conflicting statements highlighted the pervasive anxiety about an

impending conflict. Reports, such as TASS's denial of troop movements,

were released to conceal preparations for war even as secret troop transfers

were underway. High-ranking military officials understood that the

mobilization of forces suggested an impending confrontation, rather than

mere training, despite public assertions to the contrary.

CHAPTER 22: The TASS Report

On 13 June 1941, the TASS report asserted peaceful relations between the

Soviet Union and Germany, which contradicted the mounting evidence of

troop concentrations and military mobilizations at the border. Despite these

denials, preparations for war progressed, revealing a broader strategy of

deception directed not only at the enemy but also towards the Soviet military

personnel.

CHAPTER 23: The Military Districts

On 13 May 1941, orders transformed military districts into army

headquarters, emphasizing the need for wartime readiness. As commanders

departed to lead troops westward, critical internal military districts were left

unprotected, raising alarms about security and control during a significant





military buildup cloaked in the guise of training operations.

CHAPTER 24: The Black Divisions

The Second Strategic Echelon consisted mainly of black-uniformed divisions comprised of labor camp prisoners, who were mobilized under Stalin's regime before the war. This method of recruitment was designed to stave off rumors of mobilization while preparing for an offensive against Romania. The emergence of these "black divisions" took German intelligence by surprise, influencing their strategic decisions during the war's early stages, as they believed an attack was necessary to counter the threat posed by the Soviet Union's military buildup.

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
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Chapter 5 Summary: 6

Chapter Summaries

Chapter 25: The Kombrigs and the Komdivs

This chapter analyzes the rank structures within the Red Army before World War II, focusing particularly on the ranks of kombrig, komdiv, komkor, and komandarm. It discusses the military rank restructuring that Stalin implemented in May 1940, which involved demoting many commanders while promoting others to general ranks. Additionally, the chapter addresses the rehabilitation of commanders who had been imprisoned in the GULAG and were later reintegrated into military roles, shedding light on the resulting complexities in rank and command structures. The urgent need for experienced military leaders, driven by the impending confrontation with Germany, led to the release of those who had previously been incarcerated. This reintegration process was marked by inconsistencies in ranks and insignias, illustrating the dire need for competent commanders as Stalin reorganized the army.

Chapter 26: Why the Second Strategic Echelon was Formed

This chapter examines the strategic troop movements and organizational




planning of the Soviet military in 1941. It emphasizes that the formation of the Second Strategic Echelon was not a response to imminent threats but rather a pre-planned operation established well before the German invasion. The text delves into the details of troop distribution, military exercises, and the preparations made for offensive operations disguised as training activities. The chapter asserts that the Soviet leadership was deeply engaged in offensive preparations, focusing on aggressive strategies rather than solely defensive ones.

Chapter 27: Undeclared War

In the context of heightened military readiness, this chapter illustrates the preparations the Soviet Union made along its borders while portraying a facade of peace. It describes how military districts were covertly transformed into fronts, with significant troop deployments directed towards the German frontier. The organization of the military, the roles of senior generals, and the infrastructure developed for an impending offensive are examined. The chapter underscores that these arrangements were kept secret from the public, intending to set the stage for aggressive military action.

Chapter 28: Why Stalin Deployed the Fronts

This chapter explores the strategic importance of establishing operational fronts within the Soviet military framework. It explains how these fronts



were created in anticipation of conflict, taking into account both internal and external geopolitical factors. The logistics of maintaining military operations are discussed, particularly in light of the depleted resources of Soviet agriculture. The decisions made by high command to concentrate troops near enemy fronts are highlighted as part of a broader strategy aimed at aggression rather than mere defense.

Chapter 29: Why Stalin Did Not Trust Churchill

The final chapter addresses the correspondence between Churchill and Stalin leading up to the German invasion. It suggests that Stalin was skeptical of Churchill's warnings, influenced by historical tensions and the context of Churchill's military challenges. The correspondence is analyzed not as genuine caution but as strategic maneuvers meant to provoke Soviet aggression against Germany. The discussion critiques Soviet interpretations of these communications and delves into the broader implications of wartime diplomacy between Britain and the Soviet Union, highlighting Stalin's strategic foresight as World War II approached.

Through these chapters, the author reveals the complexities and contradictions of Soviet military strategy prior to the German invasion, emphasizing the proactive and aggressive stance of the Red Army, despite outward appearances of unpreparedness.





Chapter 6 Summary: 7

Chapter 30: Why Stalin Did Not Trust Richard Sorge

Stalin's Approach to Military Intelligence

Stalin maintained a tense and distrustful relationship with Soviet military intelligence, known as the GRU, where he implemented purges that led to the elimination of its leaders. Despite these disruptions, the GRU developed into a powerful and effective intelligence service, often producing high-quality intelligence, unlike its counterpart, the KGB. The high turnover in leadership did not weaken the GRU; in fact, it contributed to a more aggressive and efficient intelligence operation.

Sorge's Role and Correspondence

Richard Sorge, a spy operating in Tokyo, became a victim of Stalin's deep-seated distrust. Even though he provided valuable intelligence regarding Japan and Germany, Stalin remained skeptical due to Sorge's defection in 1938 and the surrounding rumors regarding his loyalty and reliability. Sorge frequently sought clarification about returning home but stayed in Tokyo, perhaps sensing a grim fate awaited him in the USSR.



Sorge's Intelligence Reports

Despite Sorge's considerable talents, he struggled to deliver crucial information about Germany's intentions, often presenting contradictory reports that undermined his credibility. Consequently, Stalin and the GRU, despite recognizing Sorge's abilities, found his reports untrustworthy, especially because they clashed with their own analyses.

Overview of GRU Operations

The GRU effectively monitored various indicators of Germany's military readiness. General Golikov, head of the GRU, utilized unconventional intelligence methods, assessing unusual signs, such as the state of soldiers' cleaning supplies, to enhance his reports. However, Hitler's decision to initiate Operation Barbarossa without adequate preparations rendered many of Golikov's assessments irrelevant.

Stalin's War Preparations

Stalin's preparations for war against Nazi Germany were extensive and aimed at launching an offensive. However, these plans were abruptly disrupted when Hitler invaded unexpectedly. The Soviet leadership found itself unprepared and incredulous at the German assault, leading to a frantic reaction rather than a proactive response to their own aggressive strategies.



Significance of Pre-War Intelligence

Despite substantial pre-war intelligence work signaling a possible German

threat, Stalin and his commanders operated under the belief that war was

inevitable. They thought they could time their own attack rather than

adequately prepare for the approaching German invasion.

Conclusions from Military Assessments

Later military assessments acknowledged by Soviet officials suggested that

an attack against Germany had always been intended. This revelation

provides new insight into the narratives surrounding responsibility and

intentions leading to the outbreak of hostilities on June 22, 1941. It

undermines the notion of a purely defensive Soviet strategy, emphasizing

instead a prepared offensive approach.

Chapter 31: How Hitler Frustrated Stalin's War

Context of the War Initiations

Interrogations of Nazi leaders after the war revealed that German military leaders viewed Soviet preparations as a significant threat, prompting their preemptive strike against the USSR. Admiral Kuznetsov reflected on Stalin's anticipation of war with Germany and criticized the prevailing narrative that depicted the Soviet Union as the aggressor.

Perception of War Plans

Soviet military literature and primary accounts indicate that Stalin was not merely on the defensive but was actively preparing for an offensive when the German invasion occurred. The notoriously secretive structure of Soviet military planning contributed to the misunderstanding of the operational realities faced by both leaders.

The Interplay of Leadership and Strategy

Stalin's dependence on military leaders like Zhukov, who bore significant blame for the early unpreparedness during the war, is central to the debate regarding Soviet military planning. This situation raises critical questions about accountability and the impact of a regime's internal dynamics on military outcomes.

Crisis of Control Post-Invasion

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At the outset of Operation Barbarossa, the initial Soviet responses revealed confusion and chaos within the Soviet command structure, which had become detached from the anticipated scenarios. The military's improvisation at the tactical level contrasted sharply with the previous

aggressive war planning.

Chapter 32: Did Stalin Have a War Plan?

Lack of Defensive Preparations

Soviet military textbooks acknowledged a significant lack of strategic defensive planning prior to the war, highlighting an environment of unpreparedness. The narrative that Soviet forces sought immediate offensive options underscores the absence of organized defensive tactics, despite comprehensive military drafts.

Zhukov's Role in Military Strategy

General Zhukov's leading position in the Soviet military hinted at a bias towards offensive strategies. This inclination persisted into the early war days as Soviet troops rushed into battle without well-defined plans or





coherent defensive tactics.

Contradictory Military Operations

Despite attempts to solidify offensive plans, Soviet military operations

reflected intentions that contradicted claims of a strictly defensive stance.

The positioning of Soviet forces near the border and their immediate

aggressive actions following the German attack affirmed offensive

intentions rather than a defensive rationale.

Chapter 33: The War Which Never Was

Hypothetical Considerations on Soviet Offensive Plans

Historical military insights suggest that, had the German invasion been postponed, the Soviet Union was poised to launch a preemptive strike

against Germany due to significant troop concentrations along the western

border. This raises questions about how the war might have unfolded had

Soviet plans been realized.

Imagining an Alternate Timeline



In a hypothetical scenario where the Soviet military initiated a surprise offensive, the consequences could have significantly altered the subsequent course of the war. This speculation opens discussions about missed opportunities and highlights the complexities of strategic advantages.

Reflections on Actual Historical Outcomes

Overall, this analysis calls for a reassessment of perceptions regarding the Soviet Union's role in World War II. It urges a deeper investigation into the narratives surrounding intentions, preparations, and the dynamics of power during one of history's most significant conflicts.



