Naming And Necessity PDF (Limited Copy)

Saul A. Kripke



Naming And Necessity Summary

Exploring the Essence of Naming, Necessity, and Identity in Philosophy.

Written by New York Central Park Page Turners Books Club

About the book

In "Naming and Necessity," Saul A. Kripke presents groundbreaking arguments at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of language, shifting the focus of philosophical inquiry towards the often-overlooked concepts of natural and metaphysical necessity. This work has had a lasting impact since its initial publication, reshaping discussions about names, identity, and the essential properties of individuals and categories.

Kripke critiques the dominant view in philosophy that aligns names with descriptions—a perspective that suggests that the meaning of a name can be reduced to a set of descriptive properties. He argues instead for a theory of rigid designators: names that refer to the same object in every possible world, regardless of the object's properties. This distinction is key to understanding how we identify individuals.

Exploring the implications of this theory, Kripke differentiates between essential properties—those that an object must have to be what it is—and accidental properties, which an object can have or lack without losing its identity. This insight leads him to introduce the concept of necessary a posteriori truths: statements that are necessarily true but can only be known through empirical means rather than through pure reason. For example, while it is a necessary truth that water is H_2O, one c knowledge through scientific discovery.

Furthermore, Kripke delves into identity statements, asserting that true claims about identity—such as "Hesperus is Phosphorus" (the evening star is the morning star)—can yield deeper insights into the nature of objects and their existence beyond simplistic materialist interpretations. These explorations challenge the traditional materialist views of the mind by emphasizing the unique essence of individuals.

Overall, "Naming and Necessity" not only redefines conventional understandings of names and reference but also posits essentialism as a vital framework in contemporary philosophy. With a substantial new Preface, Kripke’s work stands as a cornerstone for anyone engaging with metaphysical questions about identity, language, and existence.

About the author

Certainly! Below is a smooth and logical summary that captures the essence of Saul Aaron Kripke's background and contributions as an esteemed philosopher and logician.

Saul Aaron Kripke is a preeminent philosopher and logician, known for his profound impact across a multitude of disciplines such as logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and set theory since the 1960s. Currently an emeritus professor at Princeton University and a distinguished professor at the CUNY Graduate Center, Kripke's work has largely been influential despite much of it remaining unpublished or existing as audio recordings and privately circulated manuscripts.

His groundbreaking ideas, particularly in modal logic and the philosophy of reference, have reshaped contemporary philosophical discourse. Kripke introduced pivotal concepts like "rigid designators," which have significant implications in discussions about meaning and necessity. His influence is underscored by accolades such as the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy, alongside honorary degrees from various prestigious institutions. Additionally, he is recognized as a member of the American Philosophical Society, an elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts

and Sciences, and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy.

A survey conducted among philosophers has placed Kripke among the top ten most significant thinkers of the last two centuries, solidifying his reputation as a towering figure in modern philosophy. His intellectual legacy continues to inspire and challenge scholars in both historical and contemporary debates.

This summary provides necessary background on Kripke’s work and impact while ensuring clarity and coherence for readers unfamiliar with the subject.

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



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Summary Content List

Chapter 1 Summary:]ANUARY 20,1970

Summary of Chapter 1 of "Naming and Necessity" by Saul A. Kripke

Introduction and Background

In January 1970, Saul A. Kripke presented a series of lectures at Princeton University that delve into the complex relationship between naming and necessity within analytic philosophy. His exploration focuses on critical topics such as identity, the necessity of properties, and the philosophy of language, particularly contrasting proper names with definite descriptions.

Naming and Designators

Kripke begins by defining proper names as the specific identifiers for individuals or locations. He critiques traditional ideas, especially those of John Stuart Mill, which claim that names hold only denotation without connotation. He argues against the perspectives of Frege and Russell, who suggested that names could be reduced to definite descriptions, emphasizing that this view inadequately describes the nature of names.

The Problem of Reference

A core discussion in the chapter is the challenge of how names effectively refer to objects. Kripke argues that, although descriptions may assist in fixing reference, they do not define a name's meaning. He introduces the concept of "rigid designators," terms that consistently refer to the same object across all possible worlds, unlike non-rigid designators whose reference may change based on context.

Existential Statements and Identity

Kripke critiques the notion of cluster concepts—the idea that names correlate to a cluster of descriptive attributes used for identification. He asserts that many contingent truths about historical figures, such as Moses or Aristotle, do not translate into necessary truths about their identities, complicating our understanding of how reference and identity interact across different possible worlds.

A Priori Knowledge and Necessity

The chapter further delves into the distinctions between a priori knowledge, analytic truths, and necessary truths. Kripke challenges the notion that all a priori knowledge must be inherently necessary, proposing that contingent a priori truths can exist. He illustrates this idea through examples involving measurement definitions, which may provide value without being necessarily true.

Conclusion and Philosophical Implications

By critically challenging the views of Frege, Russell, and modern interpretations of naming and necessity, Kripke paves the way for a richer exploration of the functioning of names in language and philosophy. He posits that proper names are indeed rigid designators, a notion with significant implications for discussions surrounding language, identity, and existence. This sets a foundation for understanding the essential questions of naming and necessity, positioning Kripke's work as pivotal in re-evaluating long-held assumptions regarding the relationship between descriptive content and reference.

In summary, Chapter 1 of Kripke's "Naming and Necessity" lays the groundwork for fundamental philosophical inquiries into how naming and necessity relate to identity and truth, setting the stage for subsequent discussions in the following lectures.

Chapter 2 Summary: JANUARY 22,1970

Summary of Lecture II: "Naming and Necessity" by Saul A. Kripke

In this engaging lecture, Saul Kripke delves deeper into the philosophy of naming theories, laying out a framework where names are tied to a cluster of properties believed by a speaker to distinctly identify individuals. When these properties predominantly pertain to one individual, that person becomes the referent of the name. However, if no individual satisfies these properties uniquely, the name fails to reference anything.

Central to Kripke's exploration is the importance of a priori knowledge regarding naming—emphasizing that an understanding of names must be established prior to empirical verification. He critiques circular definitions using the example of William Kneale's assertion that "Socrates" simply refers to "Socrates." Such definitions do not furnish substantial ways to understand reference, as they merely restate what is already known.

To illustrate the challenges of naming, Kripke offers several examples of referential failures, particularly in instances that involve circular reasoning, such as descriptions like "the man who first denounced Catiline." These examples highlight frequent errors made by previous thinkers, such as John Searle, who mistakenly derived necessary truths from contingent facts about

naming.

Kripke then presents key theses regarding proper names:
1. Understanding names via unique identifying descriptions.
2. The significance of properties: a name's referent must satisfy most properties presented.
3. The complications of referential failures when multiple individuals share the same properties.
4. The possibility that reference persists even in the absence of a unique referent challenges traditional definitions of successful naming.

He further discusses the social aspect of naming, positing that reference is shaped by communal usage and historical context rather than by isolated personal understanding. This historical lineage is crucial for understanding how names are passed through time and usage, contrasting sharply with traditional theories that prioritize direct, conscious identification.

Kripke illustrates the rigidity of designation, asserting that names maintain a consistent referential identity across various possible worlds. He dismisses the assumption that the identity of a name can change based on contingent circumstances, arguing instead that names, when used rigidly, refer to the same object in all conceivable scenarios. This challenges the conventional relationship between empirical evidence and the necessity of isomorphism in naming.

In critiquing existing naming theories, Kripke underscores the inadequacy of synonym-based definitions, advocating for a framework where descriptive elements can enhance understanding without leading to circular definitions. He posits that a successful theory of naming must deftly balance descriptive clarity with historical context, avoiding logical missteps.

In conclusion, Kripke asserts that while his theory diverges from earlier frameworks of naming, it establishes a foundation ripe for further inquiry into identity statements, their truth conditions, and relationships within both contingent and necessary realms of philosophy. This forward-looking perspective invites ongoing examination and discussion about the intricate dynamics of naming and reference.

Chapter 3 Summary: JANUARY 29, 1970

Chapter 3 Summary: Naming and Necessity

Introduction

In this chapter, the author delves into the intricate relationship between names, reference, and identity, challenging the prevailing notion that the meaning of a name is derived solely from a set of uniquely identifying characteristics recognized by the speaker. Instead, the author posits that reference is fundamentally shaped by community practices and historical contexts.

Key Arguments

1. **Reference of Names**: The author asserts that the reference a name holds is not inherently linked to specific identifying traits, as traditionally thought. Instead, it is largely informed by how the name has been used and transmitted within a community.

2. **Initial Baptism and Reference Fixation**: The chapter introduces the concept of "initial baptism," where a name is attached to an object based on

certain characteristics. However, this connection does not mean that the characteristics define the name; they serve primarily to establish its reference. This remains true even in hypothetical situations where the object might lack those traits.

3. **Identity Statements**: The author discusses identity statements, such as "Cicero is Tully," emphasizing that these can reveal empirical facts about the objects being referenced rather than merely relate names. This perspective counters the view that identity is about the names themselves, focusing instead on the underlying objects.

4. **Contingency vs. Necessity**: A crucial differentiation is made between contingent truths—statements that could have been otherwise—and necessary truths, which hold across all conceivable scenarios. For instance, after establishing that Hesperus (the evening star) is the same as Phosphorus (the morning star), we recognize this identity as a necessary truth.

Essential Properties and Origin

5. **Essential Properties**: The chapter defines essential properties as those characteristics an object must possess to retain its identity. Using the example of a table, it illustrates that while its contingent properties may change, its fundamental essence remains unchanged.

6. **Natural Kinds**: The discussion extends to natural kinds, such as gold or tigers, suggesting that their identity is defined by essential properties. Discoveries about these kinds enhance our understanding of them but do not alter the referential terms we use.

Philosophical Implications

7. **Identity Theory and Materialism**: The author critiques materialist identity theories that equate mental states with specific brain states. While some scientific identities may hold necessary truth, the intrinsic nature of mental experiences cannot simply be reduced to physical states.

8. **Conclusions on Identity**: Ultimately, the chapter argues that a comprehensive understanding of mental states requires recognizing their distinctive essence. The complexities of identity theory and the mind-body problem are highlighted, suggesting ongoing debate and exploration in these areas.

Final Thoughts

This chapter enriches the discussion surrounding names, reference, and identity, paving the way for a deeper exploration of how we understand

identity in both linguistic and metaphysical contexts. By challenging traditional views, it encourages further philosophical inquiry into language and the nature of the mind.

Chapter 4: Addenda

ADDENDUM A: Amplifications of the Original Text

The addendum delves into philosophical concepts surrounding language, naming, and existence, particularly focusing on the ideas presented by Saul Kripke.

(a) **Unicorns**

The first discussion revolves around unicorns, which serve as a metaphor for examining existence. Two theses are proposed: the metaphysical thesis argues that unicorns do not exist in any conceivable reality, contrasting them with tigers, a species that undeniably exists. The epistemological thesis further asserts that discovering creatures resembling unicorns does not verify their existence; mere similarities can be misleading, much like 'fool's gold,' whose appearance does not equate to its identity as actual gold. Understanding this distinction offers clarity on the nature of existence and the importance of historical context when asserting claims about entities.

(b) **Kant's Error**

Kripke critically engages with Immanuel Kant's philosophy, particularly his

assertion that necessary truths are known exclusively a priori, or independent of experience. He posits that some necessary truths can, in fact, be learned through empirical observation, particularly highlighting identity statements as an example where knowledge can be both necessary and a posteriori, thus contradicting Kant's rigid framework. This reconciliation invites a broader understanding of how we ascertain truth and necessity.

(c) **Noncircularity Condition**

In discussing the noncircularity condition, Kripke addresses common misunderstandings about how reference is defined. While descriptions may reference past speakers without being circular, they become susceptible to error. He highlights that current references can sometimes be circular, emphasizing the need for clarity in how we determine the meaning of terms. This point strengthens the argument for a more nuanced interpretation of language and reference in philosophical discourse.

(d) **Initial Baptism**

Kripke critiques the oversimplification of naming conventions, particularly the concept of "initial baptism," where a name is first assigned to an object. He argues that not all names have a clear origin, revealing the complexities involved in naming. While these subtleties do not fundamentally undermine the theories discussed, they do add depth to our understanding of how names

operate within language.

(e) **Santa Claus and Reference Shifts**

Kripke’s analysis extends to the phenomenon of reference shifts, exemplified through the cultural figure of Santa Claus. He suggests that contemporary intention often reshapes the meaning of names, transcending their historical significance. The evolution of names, such as that of 'Madagascar,' illustrates how meanings can encompass real, fictional, or mythical aspects, necessitating a closer look at the social dimensions of naming practices and their implications for philosophical understanding.

(f) **Historical Acquisition of Naming**

In considering the historical acquisition of names, Kripke acknowledges parallels with the philosopher Keith Donnellan’s thoughts on naming, emphasizing the importance of historical context. He also discusses advances in formal logic regarding demonstratives, which play a crucial role in framing these ongoing discussions. This acknowledgment enriches the philosophical landscape of naming and reference.

(g) **Physical vs. Actual Necessity**

Concluding the addendum, Kripke challenges contemporary philosophical

notions of physical necessity, suggesting that these ideas may warrant deeper investigation. He leaves open questions regarding the nature of necessity itself, inviting further exploration into how we conceptualize and articulate necessity in philosophical thought.

Through these discussions, Kripke advances an intricate examination of existence, naming, and understanding, setting a foundational framework for potential discourse in the realm of philosophy.

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